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 ABSTRACT One of the ideological foundations of the modern welfare states is the 
belief  that people can be made happier by providing them with better living conditions. This 
belief is challenged by the theory that happiness is a fixed 'trait', rather than a variable 'state'. 
This theory figures both at the individual level and at the societal level. The individual level 
variant depicts happiness as an aspect of personal character; rooted in inborn temperament 
or acquired disposition. The societal variant sees happiness as a matter of national character; 
embedded in shared values and beliefs. Both variants imply that a better society makes no 
happier people.  
 Happiness can be regarded as a trait if it meets three criteria: 1) temporal stability, 2) 
cross-situational consistency, and 3) inner causation. This paper checks whether that is, 
indeed, the case. 
 The theory that happiness is a personal-character-trait is tested in a (meta) analysis of 
longitudinal studies. The results are: 1) Happiness is quite stable on the short term, but not in 
the long run, neither relatively nor absoloutely.  2) Happiness is not insensitive to fortune or 
adversity. 3) Happiness is not entirely built-in: its genetic basis is at best modest and 
psychological factors explain only part of its variance. 
 The theory that happiness is a national-character-trait is tested in an analysis of 
differences in average happiness between nations. The results point in the same direction: 1) 
Though generally fairly stable over the last decades, nation-happiness has changed 
profoundly in some cases both absolutely and relatively. 2) Average happiness in nations is 
clearly not independant of living conditions. The better the conditions in a country, the 
happier its citizens. 3) The differences cannot be explained by a collective outlook on life.  
 It is concluded that happiness is no immutable trait. There is thus still sense in striving 
for greater happiness for a greater number. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The pursuit of happiness 
 Happiness is a main goal in present day Western society. Individually, people try to shape 
their lives in such ways that they can enjoy them. Politically, there is massive support for 
policies that aim at greater happiness for everybody. It is widely believed that we can get 
happier than we are. There is also consensus that we should not acquiesce in current 
unhappiness. 
  The belief that we can get happier is rooted in the Humanistic view of man. Rather 
than a helpless being expelled from Paradise, man is seen as autonomous, and able to improve 
his condition by the use of reason. This view was at the core of the 19th century Utopian 
movement and is still at the ideological basis of the 20th century Welfare States. Planned 
social reform guided by scientific research is expected to result in a better society with happier 
citizens.  
  The conviction that we should try to improve happiness is rooted in Enlighted 
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thought as well. The notion that happiness is to be preferred above unhappiness figured 
already in ancient Greek moral philosophy. In the 19th century it cristallized into the 
Utilitarian doctrine that the moral value of all action depends on the degree to which it 
contributes to the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number'. Though few accept happiness as 
the only and ultimate goal in life, it is generally agreed that happiness is worth pursuing. 
Happiness ranks high in public opinion surveys on value priorities. See a.o. Harding 
(1985:231.) 
 
 This ideology is not unchallenged however. It is argued that happiness is not the most 
valuable goal and it is claimed that we cannot get happier even if we would want to. 
  The objection that happiness is not worth pursuing rests partly in religious doctrines 
that glorify suffering. Such doctrines figure in Calvinist moral philosophy and in some 
variants of Hinduism. Objections come also from advocates of other endvalues who are eager 
to depreciate the competitor. Many Marxists for instance reject happiness as something 'false', 
equality being the only 'true' value they accept. Such moral objections find support in theories 
about adverse effects of happiness. Happiness is said to make people politically uncritical, 
socially unresponsive and morally decadent. Mild unhappiness would be preferable in the 
long run. Elswhere I have examined these claims empirically and found most of them untrue. 
See Veenhoven (1988, 1989.) 
  The objection that we cannot raise happiness, even if we wanted to, rests on two 
lines of thought. The first is that we are unable to change society according to plan; this is the 
theme of limits to social engeneering. The second denunciation is that even succesful 
improvement of society would help little. A better society would not make people any 
happier. This latter objection draws on two theories: One theory holds that happiness is 
'relative'. Any improvement in living conditions would soon result in a rise in standards of 
comparison and would therefore leave us as (un)happy as before. The other theory is that 
happiness is a fixed 'trait' rather than a variable 'state'. Improvements of external living 
conditions would therefore not result in greater happiness, the evaluation of life being largely 
determined by an internal disposition to enjoy it. Elsewhere I have tested the theory that 
happiness is relative (Veenhoven, 1991). That theory was largely refuted. This paper 
considers the claim that happiness is a fixed trait. This latter theory will appear to lose 
considerable ground as well. 
 
 The idea of fixed happiness 
 The notion that happiness is essentially unalterable figures in psychological thinking as well 
as in sociological thought.  
  Psychologists who adhere to this view think of happiness or unhappiness as a stable 
disposition towards life rather that as the variable outcome of an ongoing evaluation of it. 
Some even regard happiness as a 'personality' trait: that is a tendency to react (judge life) 
similarly across different situations. Chronic states, as manifested in some forms of 
pathological unhappiness (depression, ahedonia), are believed to be the rule. 
  Sociologists in this tradition see the happiness of individuals as a reflection of 
collective 'national character'. The outlook on life implied in common values and beliefs is 
seen to pervade individual perceptions and evaluations. As collective outlook is largely an 
invariant matter, individual judgements geared by it are seen to be rather static as well.   
 
 Personal character 
 The idea of a 'happy personality' has several variations. One is that people are born as either 
happy or unhappy. In this view happiness is a temperamental disposition, possibly based in 
the neurophysiological structure of pleasure centers in the brain. Some people would be apt to 
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feel cheerfull and hence be positive about their life, even in difficult conditions, whereas 
others are prone to depression and hence judge their lives negatively even in favourable 
situations. See a.o. Tellegen (1988).  
  Another variation is that happiness is an acquired disposition. Some people 
would develop a positive attitude towards life, whereas others would become sour. In this vein 
Lieberman (1970:74) wrote: "... at some point in life, before even the age of 18, an individual 
becomes geared to a certain stable level of satisfaction, which - within a rather broad range of 
environmental circumstances - he maintains throughout life". 
  Whatever the variant, the idea of happiness as a personality trait implies that people 
tend to remain as happy or unhappy as they are, and that improvement or detoriation in their 
living conditions does not make them more or less happy. An explicit account of this 
implication can be found with Costa et al (1987:305), who write: "... happiness is ultimately 
also independant of health, youth, power and other life circumstances..". 
  
 National Character   
 The idea that there are happy and unhappy nations is part of common sense knowledge. For 
example: the Italians are seen as easygoing and light-hearted, whereas the Swedes are 
attributed a gloomy outlook on life. Comparision of average scores on survey questions about 
happiness show striking differences between nations, though typically not the ones predicted 
(see Scheme  5 )
  Sociologists who have considered these differences also refer to cultural variation in 
outlook. Inkeles (1990/91:93) for instance attributes the difference in happiness between 
nations to "national creed". "Given the tendency to report oneself as happy or unhappy seems 
to be a relatively stable characteristic of given national populations, in short a statistically 
reliable measure of the feeling state of the nation, would seem to justify describing it as truly a 
national character trait". Likewise Inglehart (1990:30) writes that cross-national differences in 
happiness "reflect cognitive cultural norms, rather than individual grief and joy". He sees 
these norms as rooted in "profound differences in outlook" between nations.  
  Two issues tend to be confused in discussions on this m atter: 'cultural bias' in 
measurement of happiness and 'culturally induced difference' in happiness itself. The attention 
has been focused very much on the issue of measurement bias (Ostroot & Snyder 1985, 
Veenhoven 1986, Ouweneel & Veenhoven 1989). Yet most relevant in the discussion at issue 
here is the presumed effect of cultures on the evaluation of life as such.  
 
 Approach 
 The aim of this paper is to explore the tenability of these claims empirically. Is happiness 
really that unalterable a matter that it is not worth trying to reach out for more? To answer this 
question I will take stock of the available research findings and check whether happiness 
appears to be static or not.  
  First I will check the claim that happiness is in itself a rather invariant 'personality 
trait'. I will consider the available longitudinal studies on happiness to assess its stability over 
time, as well as its sensitivity to fortune and adversity. I will also inspect whether the 
evaluation of life is largely determined by 'inner' psychological characteristics rather than by 
'external' living conditions. That analysis will be at the individual level.  
  Next I will consider the hypothesis that average happiness in nations reflects a 
collective 'idea fixe' rather than the actual quality of life in the country. For that purpurse I will 
consider the stability of average happiness in nations: how stable is it over time, how 
dependant on living conditions in the nations and how much rooted in shared values and 
beliefs? That analysis will be at the societal level. 
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 Concept of happiness 
 The answer to these questions depends on the precise concept of happiness used. Some things 
called happiness are more static than others. 'Frustration-tolerance' is for instance likely to be 
more stable than 'elated mood'. The current confusion about variability of happiness is in fact 
largely due to sloppy conceptualisation of the matter. 
  The concept of happiness used here is in line with the Utilitarian conception of 
happiness as the 'sum of pleasures and pains'. The focus is on the 'subjective' appreciation of 
life and not on any 'objective' qualities of the individual himself or his living conditions. 
Happiness is defined as the degree to which an individual evaluates the overall quality of 
his/her life-as-a-whole positively. This definition is delineated in more detail in Veenhoven 
(1984: ch 2). Within this concept two components of happiness are distinguished. The first 
component is hedonic level of affect, which is the degree to which pleasant affective 
experiences outbalance unpleasant ones generally. The second component is called 
contentment and concerns the degree to which the individual perceives his wants to have been 
met. These components represent respectively 'affective' and 'cognitive' appraisals of life and 
are seen to figure as sub-totals in the overall evaluation of life, called overall happiness.  
 
 Measures of happiness 
 Happiness as defined here can be measured by means of questioning. Various claims 
to the contrary have been disproven empirically. (Research reviewed in Veenhoven 1984:ch 
3). Though measurable in principle, not all the questions and scales that are used measure this 
kind of happiness validly. Elsewhere I have reviewed current indicators and distinguished 
between acceptable and unacceptable ones (Veenhoven 1984:ch 4). This paper considers only 
data based on indicators that were deemed acceptable. As a consequence several well known 
studies on this matter are left out. The studies used here were located by means of the World 
Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 1992). 
 
 
 Concept of trait 
 The term 'trait' is used in contrast to 'state'. A trait is seen as a durable characteristic of a 
person or society, that is in some way 'built-in'. A trait is a 'chronic' phenomenon. On the other 
hand a state is thought of as something essentially variable, that is continually (re-)produced. 
Traits are typically seen as causes, states as results. 
  Several criteria have been suggested to mark the difference more sharply. See 
Chaplin et al (1988). Three of these are relevant for the problem at hand here, 1) temporal 
stability, 2) cross-situational consistency, and 3) internal (rather than external) causation. 
These three criteria will be used in the following tests of the theory that happiness is a trait. 
 
 
2. IS HAPPINESS A PERSONAL TRAIT? 
 
 The question whether happiness can be characterized as a stable personal 'trait' rather than a 
variable 'state' is not new: trait-state discussions have raged in many fields of psychology. In 
the field of subjective well-being the issue was already under debate in the thirties (Young 
1937). Recent contributions to this discussion have been made by Aron & Aron (1987), Costa 
et al. (1984, 1987, 1988), Chamberlain & Zika (1992), Kozma (1990), McNeal et al (1986), 
Mohr (1986), Mortimer & Lorence (1981), Mussen et al. (1980, 1982), Harley & Lavery 
(1991), Ormel (1980), Palmore (1977), Stones et al (1986, 1989, 1991) Tellegen et al (1988) 
and Yardley & Rice (1991). Most of these authors stress the trait-character of subjective well-
being, in particular Stones and Kozma who conclude that happiness can be raised only by 
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psycho-therapy (1989:534). Conclusions are typically based on rather fragmentary data, short 
follow-ups and dubious indicators of happiness. 
  I will now consider the matter in the light of all the data that is currently available. 
These data allow a test of three hypotheses involved in the theory that hapiness is a personal 
trait. These hypotheses are implied in the definition of trait above. The first hypothesis is that 
happiness is temporally stable (par. 2.1), the second that it is trans-situationally consistent 
(par. 2.2) and the third that it is internally caused (par. 2.3). 
 
 
2.1 Temporal stability: Do the happy remain happy? 
 The notion of a personal 'trait' involves different assumptions, which tend to be confused in 
this discussion. One assumption is that some people are characteristically more happy than 
others. Even if living conditions were identical for everybody there would be happy and 
unhappy people. When these people go through similar ups and downs in life, the difference 
remains; their happiness rises and drops in the same degree, but change starts at a different 
level.This view is pictured in figure 1a on Scheme  1.Let's call this the relative stability of 
happiness. 
  The other assumption is that the appreciation of life is so much a dispositional matter 
that it hardly follows ups and downs at all. In this view happiness remains essentially at the 
same level, irrespective of the actual quality of life and changes for the better or worse. This 
more extreme view is depicted in figure 1b. I will refer to it as absolute stability.  
  This latter theory is at issue here. Theory 1b denies that improvement of living 
conditions adds to the subjective appreciation of life and thus predicts that a better society 
makes no happier citizens. Theory 1a does not. It only renounces the possibility that 
everybody can be made equally happy, social progress prolonging the difference between 
happy and unhappy at a higher average level. 
 
 Relative stability 
 Relative temporal stability is mostly assessed by means of follow-up studies and expressed in 
overtime-correlations. An overtime-correlation of +.90 means that the rankorder of happiness 
in a population has almost remained the same during the period studied. Several investigations 
have reported high overtime-correlations of happiness. These results are often cited. 
  In order to obtain a more complete view I gathered all studies that have ever assessed 
overtime-correlations of happiness. I found some hundred studies, of which 26 appeared to 
have used acceptable indicators of happiness. Together these studies yield 65 overtime-
correlations: 30 on overall happiness, 25 on hedonic level and 6 on contentment. The time 
span of these studies varies from one month to forty years. The correlations are presented in 
exihibit 2 in a time diagram. The data are presented in more detail in appendix A. 
 
 Stable on that short term, but not on the long run 
 Trait-theory is confimed by the fact that overtime-correlations are almost all positive. 
However most of the correlations cannot be defined as 'high'. The range of the correlations is 
from -.10 to +.70, the average around +.35. 
  It appears that the stability of happiness is a short-term matter. The highest 
correlations concern mainly time lags of several months; overtime correlations are around 
+.60. Over the years the correlations drop considerably. After five years overtime-correlation 
is almost halved and varies around +.30. Over periods of ten to fifteen years the correlation 
shrinks back to about +.15. Extrapolation of this trend predicts complete disappearance of all 
overtime-correlation after twenty years. However, the only study that covered a longer period 
observed a slightly higher overtime-correlation. In Mussen's forty year follow-up the average 
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correlation is +.23. Possibly this is due to the measurement method used in that study. It 
assessed happiness by means of interviewer ratings rather than by means of self-reports. The 
interviewer ratings may have been coloured by simultaneous observation of some stable 
personality traits. 
  Even if Mussen's observation is correct, it indicates that happiness in young 
adulthood explains only 10% of happiness in late adulthood, probably  even less. 
  The true stability of happiness is probably somewhat higher than the correlations 
suggest. The size of overtime-correlations depends also on the accuracy of measurement: 
many errors depress the correlation. True stability can be estimated by 'attenuation' of 
overtime-correlations: commonly by dividing them by the square root of the reliability 
coefficient. The reliability of single direct questions on happiness as assessed by repeating the 
question in an interview or by retests after some days is typically about +.70. That means that 
the true stability of happiness is probably some 15% higher: about +.55 after one year, about 
+.35 after five years, and about +.15 after ten or more years. 
  The decline of the overtime-correlations follows a curvilinear pattern. Stability drops 
sharply in the first few years, but stabilizes at a low level in the longer run. The asymptote is 
probably about +.20. This suggests that there is some minor 'hard core'. However it is not at all 
sure that this hard core represents the hypothesized 'personality trait'. It could just as well be 
constancy in living conditions or constancy in traits other than happiness. We will deal further 
with this possibility in paragraph 2.3. 
  Overtime-correlations of measures of 'hedonic level' (largely Bradburn's Affect 
Balance Scale) are typically lower than those of the indicators of 'overall happiness' and 
'contentment'. This is consistent with the view of happiness as an acquired attitude to which 
people tend to stick to cognitively, unless major changes lead to a reorientation. The relatively 
low stability of hedonic level of affect does not fit the theory that tendency to feel cheerful or 
not is largely inborn. This claim will be considered in more detail in 2.3 as well. 
  
 Lower stability through serious lifechange   
 If happiness is a trait, overtime-correlations must remain at the same level, even in periods of 
profound lifechange. If however happiness is essentially a judgement that is continually re-
assessed, we can expect a drop in overtime-correlations in periods of transition. There are 
three reasons to expect this. First, transitions may involve a change in quality of life and hence 
invite to a change in the evaluation of it. Secondly, new situations press towards a 
reorientation on life anyway. Thirdly, re-orientation typically involves some time of changing 
tentative judgements before the individual decides on a more definitive evaluation of this life. 
During this period the temporal stability of happiness is likely to be low as well. 
  Several studies have assessed overtime-correlations among subjects who went 
through some transition. Mostly the transitions considered are not very dramatic: leaving 
school, entering marriage, taking a new job, moving to an other house, etc. Overtime-
correlations appear slightly lower among such transitors, but not much. (Data not shown). 
However, overtime-correlations do seem to be lower at times when really dramatic events 
occur.  Walz (1986:77) observed a lower overtime-correlation among cardiac patients in the 
first half year after their first heart attack, than in the second half year. T1-T2 correlation was 
about +.40; which is relatively low on a 6 month interval. T2-T3 correlation was about +.60 
which is around the usual level. 
 
 Absolute stability  
 Overtime-correlations indicate the degree to which differences in happiness between subjects 
remain similar over time (relative stability), but do not inform about stability in the level of 
happiness (absolute stability). In other words: high overtime-correlation does not mean 
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absence of change. 
  This matter is nicely illustrated in the case of renal patients who received a donor-
kidney. The happiness of these patients increased dramatically after the transplant. When still 
on the waiting list only 31% saw themself as happy, but one year after the transplant no less 
than 79% did so! This temporal upsurge of happiness is known as the 'Golden period'. Still the 
overtime-correlation in this period is quite sizable: r = +.46 p<.001 (Simmons et al 1977: 61-
62).  
  In a parallel study of kidney donors these investigators show in more detail how 
happiness changes after transplantion. Only 32% appear to have remained equally happy one 
year after the donation: 24% became less happy and 44% became more happy. Those initially 
least happy were most likely to have  experienced a decrease in life-satisfaction, while those 
initially most happy had profited most (p. 180-192). Thus the relative differences have been 
largely maintained, whereas the absolute levels of happiness have changed profoundly. 
 
 
 Happiness is quite variable 
 The easiest way to assess absolute stability of happiness is to ask people how happy they have 
been over the years. A common device for that purpose is the 'Life-Satisfaction Chart' 
(Kuhlen, 1948) on which respondents characterize their retrospective happiness by a line in a 
graph. If happiness is a trait, people must typically draw horizontal lines: if it is rather a state-
like matter, deflections will be the rule. The latter pattern is by far the most common. Most 
people remember distinct differences in happiness. (Data not shown). 
  It is of course possible that reminiscences about happiness in earlier phases of life are 
inaccurate and that differences in earlier happiness tend to be over-estimated. Therefore we 
must also consider follow-up studies of present happiness. A good study of that kind was 
performed by Landua (1992). Landua analysed the yearly reponses on a 11 point life-
statisfaction scale over a four-year period. He focused on 'substantial' changes; that is changes 
between four main categories (score 0-4, 5-6, 7-8 and 9-10). Only 10% of his respondents 
appeared to have stayed in the same satisfaction category for all four years; 90% had moved 
to another category. Landua observed quite radical changes: of the initially very unhappy 
movers (score 0-4) no less than 18% came to see  themselves as very happy (score 9-10) in 
this four-year period. Similarly Heady & Weaving (1992:126) found that about one third of 
their subjects in an 8 year panel study changed more then one standard deviation in both 
overall happiness and hedonic level. 
 
 Unhappiness less constant than happiness   
 If happiness is a fixed trait, dissatisfaction with life must be equally invariant as satisfaction. If 
however happiness is rather a judgement that is periodically reviewed, we can imagine that 
dissatisfaction is less of a lasting matter. We can expect so, because the discomfort of 
unhappiness involves a pressure to change; either to improve living-conditions or to revise 
ones judgement of life. On the other hand the happy are likely to maintain their judgement of 
life unless serious adversity urges a re-evaluation. 
  I found two German investigations that test this hypothesis. The first is a study by 
Brachtel & Zapf (1984:329) which involved a two year follow-up. Of the respondents who 
avowed themselves 'happy' at T1 39% gave the same rating on a 8 point scale at T2, whereas 
of the initially unhappy only 23% did so. The constancy of scores on the life-satisfaction item 
was 27% and 13% respectively. Likewise in the four year follow-up study Landua (1992: 
227) observed that 27% of the happy remained equally satisfied over that period, and only 
12% of the unhappy.  
  Clearly unhappiness is less constant than happiness.  
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 Source of stability can be conditions for happiness rather than happiness-as-such  
 Though less than expected, the constancy of happiness over time is still note-worthy. Does 
that mean that happiness is at least partly a personal trait? Not necessarily so. The statistical 
stability can also be the result of other things than an inner disposition to enjoy life. 
   Firstly, the correlations can be due to the stability of other personal characteristics 
other than happiness: f.e. to good health, a nice character and ability to deal with the problems 
of life. Such traits other than happiness can obviously add to the chance that things go well in 
life and hence that satisfaction with life tends to remain high. Happiness appears then as a 
stable trait, but is in fact an essentially variable state reproduced over and again. 
   Secondly, the overtime-correlation can be due to stability in living conditions. 
People who have a high income, a nice spouse and good connections mostly maintain these 
advantages over their lifetime. Sociologists have shown that there is much continuity in social 
inequalities.  
 
 Overtime-correlation disappears after controls 
 In order to isolate these effects empirically we must remove the influence of stable pre-
conditions for happiness from the overtime-correlations. I know only of one study that 
involved such an analysis. Chiriboga (1984:474) considered the stability of happiness over 11 
years in a sample of people in transition. He controlled baseline personality and social status. 
He found hardly any overtime-correlation:     ß = +.02 among males and -.18 among females. 
Not baseline-happiness appeared to predict happiness 11 years later, but baseline-personality; 
in particular earlier mental health and self-criticism predicted later happiness.  
 
 
2.2 Situational consistency: Are people equally happy in fortune and adversity? 
 If happiness is a trait-like disposition rather than a state-like evaluation of life, happiness must 
remain largely the same in different situations. People living in good conditions can then be 
expected to be equally happy as people in bad conditions. Change for the better or worse will 
not render them any happier or unhappier. Some authors claim that this is exactly what 
empirical research has shown: a remarkable lack of correspondence between 'objective' living 
conditions and the 'subjective' appreciation of life. See Brickman et. al. (1978:925), Easterlin 
(1974) and Inglehart & Rabier (1985:30). 
 
 Perceived effects 
 A first test of this hypothesis is checking whether it fits common life-experience. This can be 
done by asking people whether major life-events in the past did affect their happiness at that 
time. De Frain and Ernst (1978:988) asked parents about their adjustment to sudden death of 
their infant some years ago. These parents typically report a drastic drop in their personal 
happiness at the death of their infant, followed by a gradual recovery to the original level in 2 
to 3 years. Likewise studies with the above mentioned 'Life-Satisfaction Chart' show that 
people link up and downs in retrospective happiness with specific positive and negative times 
in their life (McKinley Runyan, 1979). Reminiscences may be inaccurate however, and biased 
by the evaluation of events. Therefore we must also consider situational correlates of present 
happiness. 
 
 Actual effects 
 Comparisons of present happiness across situations show some striking non-differences. 
There is for instance little difference in happiness between rich and poor; at least in affluent 
welfare states. In present day Western nations happiness is neither related to age, sex nor 
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education. Yet it is an exaggeration to say that happiness does not relate to any circumstances. 
Empirical research has identified several conditions where it does. Let's take a closer look at 
the available evidence: 
 
Cross-sections: unfortunates less happy  
 First of all there is a wealth of cross-sectional studies that found less happiness among people 
in adverse conditions than in favourable ones. For instance,  people appear typically less 
happy in bad health than in good health and in isolation than in companionship. A problem in 
such comparisons is that living in either good or bad conditions may sometimes be a result of 
earlier happiness or unhappiness. Health and social integration depend to some extent on one's 
enjoyment of life (Veenhoven 1988, 1989). Therefore it is better to focus on differences in 
living conditions that are clearly beyond the control of the individual.  
  Scheme  3 presents some data on the relation of happiness to uncontrollable hardship: 
'widowhood', 'physical disability' and 'minority status'. In all cases adversity relates to a lower 
appreciation of life. The differences are greatest in the cases of recent personal disaster 
(miners' widows and recently paralyzed accident victims) and smallest in the case of long 
term disabled. This suggests that happiness drops drastically after serious adversity, but tends 
to revive in the long run. This is also more in line with the state-view on happiness than with 
the trait-view. 
 
 Follow-ups: change for the worse followed by decline in happiness.  
 Methodologically it is of course preferable to assess the effects of fortune and adversity 
longitudually. Scheme 4 presents some relevant findings. Happiness appears consistently 
lower after life change for the worse. The effects remain visible over periods longer than a 
year. 
  It is worth noting that several of these studies control the effect of earlier personality 
(Eels, Chiriboga, Heady). This reduces the effect of life change on happiness, but does not 
wipe it out. Here again we see that happiness-as-such must be conceptually distinguished 
from happiness-related-personality. 
 
 
 Apparently happiness is not insensitive to fortune or adversity. People do adjust their 
evaluation of life if the actual quality of their life changes. That is not to say that happiness 
fluctuates with every move to the better or worse. Only serious shifts seem to bring about a re-
orientation.  
 
 
2.3 Inner causation: Is happiness mere psychology? 
 Traits theorists expect happiness to be temporally stable and situationally constant because 
they believe that happiness is in some way 'built-in'. They presume the existence of an inner 
disposition to enjoy life or not. Such disposition has been conceived in several ways: as an 
innate affective 'temperament'  and as more or less acquired cognitive inclination. There is 
more speculation on this matter than solid data.  Let us take a look at a few relevant 
investigations. 
 
 Evidence for existence of innate disposition 
 The theory of innate happiness presumes that a tendency to appreciate life is in some way 
wired in; possibly in the neuro-chemical structure of the pleasure centres in the brain. Two 
testable predictions can be derived from this theory: The first is that people who are alike 
genetically must also be alike in happiness, irrespective of upbringing and variation in living 
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conditions. This prediction can be tested by comparing twins: preferably mono-zygotic and 
di-zygotic twins reared apart and reared together. The second prediction is that people who 
were happy as children must be happy in adulthood as well. This hypothesis can be tested by 
following people from the beginning of life; preferably from infancy on.  
 
 Comparison of twins: modest correspondence in happiness  
 Several studies have compared the well-being of twins, but only one of these used an indicator 
that meets my demands for the valid measurement of happiness. That is a study by 
Wierzibicki (1986) which measured hedonic level by means of a mood diary. Hedonic level 
appeared to be more alike among mono-zygotic twins (r = +.55) than among di-zygotic twins 
(r = +.15). This findings suggests some genetic influence, though only a modest one; there are 
still considerable mood differences among identical twins. However, it is not sure that 
happiness-as-such is the genetic factor. The correlation can also be due to effects on happiness 
of other innate characteristics.  
  
 Follow-up from birth on; no constancy in happiness  
 There is also only one long term study that has followed happiness from  infancy on. This is 
the famous Berkely Guidance Study (Schaefer & Bailey, 1963). In the context of this broad 
developmental study hedonic level was assessed in the first years of life. Hedonic level was 
rated several times on the basis of expressive behaviour (laughing, crying etc.) These ratings 
were made at regular visists of mother and child to an obstetric clinic. Twelve ratings were 
made between birth and age 3. These ratings appeared very stable over this period and could 
be regarded as a manifestation of inborn cheerfulness. 
  Between age 12 and 18 these same subjects went through several interviews and 
tests. Later on the protocols were used to derive indicators of adolescent happiness. A content 
analysis was performed by two independant assessors who charcterized the subject in several 
dimensions. Two of these dimensions were 'gloomy' and 'not cheerful'. These were combined 
in a sum score that characterizes adolescent hedonic level. This score appeared unrelated to 
average baby-cheerfulness: r = -.11 (ns). Another score representing adolescent contentment 
(discontented, unhappy, dissatisfied, complaints) appeared not related to baby-cheerfulness 
either: r = -.03 (ns). Clearly this finding does not fit the prediction that people born happy 
remain happy. Yet there are methodological reasons to doubt the evidence: it is based on a 
very small number of girls (N = 11).  
 
 These two tests do not support the theory of innate happiness. That is in line with wider twin 
research, where cheerfulness does typically not appear as a genetically transmitted propensity. 
In fact Buss & Plomin (1984) identified only three temperaments for which an inherited 
contribution is likely to exist: emotionality, activity and sociability. These characteristics may 
facilitate happiness, but do not constitute happiness-as-such. Their effect on happiness is 
likely to be contingent to situations. 
 
 Evidence for dominance of psychological determinants 
 If innate dispositions to be happy are at best weak, it is still possible that we acquire a strong 
propensity of that kind. There is in fact a rich literature on how unhappy personalities develop. 
Traumatic experience and inapt learning are seen to produce distorted perception, unrealistic 
ambitions and inadequate coping. Chronic frustation and depressed affect is seen as the 
inevitable result. Even if external conditions are favourable, such inner handicaps would 
doom you to unhappiness. On the other hand good psychological health is depicted as a fairly 
sure ticket to happiness.  
  It is beyond doubt that inner characteristics influence happiness. Yet it is not so clear 
Ruut Veenhoven 10 Is happiness a trait?
 
 
to what extent these dominate the appraisal of life, especially not among psychologically 
healthy people. 
 
 External factors play a role  
 Several investigators have tried to grasp the relative impact of 'external' and 'internal' factors 
on happiness. External factors are usually split up in 'social resources' (income, education, 
status, social networks, etc.) and 'life-events' (illness, job loss, marriage, etc.). Internal factors 
are typically personality traits (extraversion, neuroticism, control orientation, etc.). The typical 
conclusion of such studies is that external factors explain less variance in happiness than one 
would expect and internal factors more.  
  The most sophisticated study of this kind is an Australian panel study by Heady and 
Wearing (1989, 1992), which also found that most variance was explained by personality 
(35%). Yet that study also showed that social resources and life events make a difference over 
and above personality, and explain 7% of the variance by themselves.   
  
 These results are sometimes presented as evidence for the claim that happiness is mere 
psychology. The data does not justify that conclusion however.  
  Firstly, external factors still influence happiness independantly of personality, though 
the variance explained may be less than expected it is still significant. 
  Secondly, these data probably underestimate the actual effects in the populations 
studied. Systematic measurement error tends to attenuate correlations with external factors, 
while boosting correlation with psychological variables (Moum, 1988).  
  Thirdly, and most importantly, this pattern may say more about the societies in 
which these investigations took place than about the nature of happiness. The observations are 
made in affluent egalitarian and peaceful societies. Inner factors differentiate better between 
happy and unhappy in these societies, because external conditions are fairly good and equally 
distributed. Probably the relative impact of psychological factors is smaller in a social context 
of poverty, deprivation and upheavel.  
 
 'Inner causated' is not the same as 'immutable' 
 If there is some 'inner' happiness propensity, the next question is what that consists of 
precisely. Two kinds of psychological characteristics have been mentioned in that context: 
dispositions that more or less 'constitute' happiness and characteristics that typically 'facilitate' 
its achievement. Lets consider what qualities may be involved, and whether these are likely to 
fix happiness at a certain stable level. 
 
 Constituants. A possible inner constituant of happiness is the tendency to take a rosy look at 
everything, sometimes refered to as the 'Pollyanna tendency'. Such a personality trait 
obviously manifests in a more positive evaluation of life-as-a-whole. Pollyannaism is indeed 
correlated to happiness, but not very strongly (Matlin & Gawron, 1979). By itself it can 
therefore not be an inner anchor that fixes evaluations of life to the same level.  
  Another possible inner constituant of happiness is an 'attitude' towards ones life. As 
noted above, evaluations of life may crystallize in a stable set of beliefs. However, if such 
attitudes exist at all, they are unlikely to remain fixed forever. Elsewhere I have suggested that 
people stick to the same evaluation only if they feel no pressures for a re-evaluation 
(Veenhoven, 1991:17). This view supports the notion that there is some inner happiness-set 
whilst remembering the evidence that happiness is not insentive to environmental change. As 
yet that presumed process of 'freezing' and 'unfreezing' of happiness attitudes has not been 
examined empirically.  
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 Facilitators. Commonly mentioned inner facilitators of happiness are 'extraversion', 'inner-
control' and 'hardiness'. These personality traits are believed to add to the chances to realizes 
one's ambitions. In that context Heady and Wearing (1992:95) showed for example that 
extraversion facilitates intimate relationships, which in turn makes life more enjoyable. 
'Neuroticism' typically induces a constant stream of negative life-events. Again we must 
realize that these effects are context bound; inner control may facilitate happiness in an 
individualized society that allows choice, but may be detrimental to it in confined situations.  
  Such inner facilitators of happiness are not necessarily fixed traits themselves. 
People can become more extraverted and less neurotic during their life. Social improvements 
such as better mental health care may stimulate such changes. In the long term will better 
socialisation and a safer society also make the next generations better equiped psychologically 
to cope with the problems of modern life.  
 
 In summary: Even if there is a marked inner disposition to be happy or not, that does not mean 
a better society cannot make people any happier. 
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3. IS HAPPINESS A CULTURAL TRAIT?3) 
 
 We now shift to the macro level and consider the claim that the appreciation of life is not 
really the result of an individual evaluation, but rather a reflection of collectively pre-
conceived ideas. In this view happiness is a fixed social construction that has little to do with 
the variable realities of life. Therefore happines would be largely insensitive to improvement 
of living conditions.  
 
 Differences in happiness between nations 
 During the last decades questions on happiness have figured in representative surveys in many 
countries. Comparison of the responses reveals striking differences. Scheme  5 presents the 
average scores on equivalent questions in 30 nations around 1980. Average happiness tends to 
be lower in developing countries than in rich industrialized nations. Average happiness is 
highest in the Netherlands (7.63 on a 10-0 scale) and lowest in India (5.16). Among the rich 
nations considerable differences exist as well. For instance Italians and the Japanese take less 
pleasure in life than Australians and the Swedes.  
  Similar differences in happiness have been observed in other cross-nation studies: in 
comparison between industrialized countries by Buchanan and Cantril (1953), Inkeles (1960, 
1991) and Inglehart (1977/1992) and in global surveys by Cantril (1965) and Gallup (1976). 
These studies involved other indicators of happiness as well. The pattern of differences 
between countries appears almost the same when different measures of happiness are 
compared. See Veenhoven 1993. 
  
 Explanations of differences in happiness between nations  
 There are three possible explanations for these differences: cultural bias in the measurements 
of happiness, differences in quality of living conditions and differences in view on life. 
  The measurement-bias explanation is that the seemingly identical questions on 
happiness work out differently accross countries. Possible sources of bias mentioned are: 
variation in social desirability distortion between countries, problems of precise translation 
and cultural variation in response tendencies. Elsewhere I have considered the empirical 
evidence for these claims. None of them was supported by the data (Ouweneel & Veenhoven, 
1991). 
  The explanation in terms of societal quality assumes that the differences in response 
to questions about happiness reflect true variation in appreciation of life. This variation is 
attributed to differences in 'quality' of the living conditions societies provide to their citizens, 
such as food and shelter, safety, adequate care for children, fit between socialized and 
required behaviours and opportunities for self-actualization. Accounts of this kind have been 
proposed by Inglehart (1977) and Veenhoven (1984:ch.6). This explanation has also been 
used in accounts of differences in other aspects of well-being, such as cross-national 
differences in suicide, mental disorder and drug abuse (see e.g. Naroll, 1982). Basic postulates 
are that societies can be more or less effective in meeting human needs and that ineffective 
need gratification manifests itself in bad health, mental disturbance and dissatisfaction with 
life. In terms of trait theory this means that happiness is not consistent across situations. 
  Finally the national character explanation is at stake here. As we have seen the core 
of this explanation is that collective beliefs and values in a society mould individual 
evaluations of life. Some cultures are believed to predispose to a negative outlook on life, 
whereas others are said to foster a positive view. Various cultural differences have been 
mentioned in this context: Inglehart (1990:30) suggests "that the culture component of these 
differences reflects the distinctive historical experience of the respective nationalities. Long 
periods of disappointed expectations give rise to cynical attitudes. These orientations may be 
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transmitted from generation to generation through pre-adult socialisation". Religion has also 
been mentioned in this context. Calvinism is often said to breed unhappiness, because of its 
gloomy outlook on the future and its moral rejectance of lust. Whatever the cultural 
mechanisms presumed, the underlying psychological assumption in all these reasonings is that 
happiness is largely a cognitive matter that is only loosely linked to real life-experience.  
  If happiness is indeed a matter of national character, we can expect that it meets the 
three trait criteria at the collective level. This paragraph checks whether that is the case or not. 
First I will inspect whether average happiness in countries remains the same over the years 
(temporal stability, section 3.1). Next I consider whether average happiness in nations is 
independant of the quality of living conditions in the country (situational consistency, section 
3.2.). Finally I test some implications of the theory that happiness is a matter of collective 
outlook (inner causation: section 3.3.). 
 
 
3.1 Temporal stability: Do (un)happy countries remain (un)happy? 
 Time-series on average happiness are only available for some industrialized countries. In the 
USA happiness has been followed since 1945, in Japan since 1958 and in the EC countries 
since 1974. At the individual level that would be a significant time-lag, but at the societal 
level it is only a very short period. Next to these time-series (yearly surveys that use the same 
question)) there are some more incidental data that allow a look at the temporal stability of 
public happiness. Data on happiness in nations were found in Veenhoven (1993). 
 
 Relatively stability 
 The first comparative study on happiness in nations was performed in 1948 by Buchanan & 
Cantril (1953) among 9 countries. These same countries figure in the 1980  World Value 
Study. Though not identical, the measures of happiness (life-satisfaction) are quite alike. 
Scheme 6 presents the rank-orders. Four countries appear to have remained in the same 
position, five countries changed position by two or three steps. Norway and Mexico fell back, 
whereas Britain, France and Germany advanced in relative happiness. The rank-order 
correlation is +.73. 
 
 Absolute stability 
 In several countries happiness has remained at about the same level during the last decades. 
The USA is one of these: in 1948 36% of the Americans characterized themselves 'very 
happy' and 54% 'fairly happy'. Forty years later (1988) these percentages were 34% and 57% 
(Veenhoven 1993:table 1.1.1a). In Japan happiness has remained at the same level as well in 
the years 1958-1988 (Veenhoven 1993:table 1.2.1a). 
  However, there are also some countries where happiness has changed considerably. 
For instance, in 1954 26% of the Germans characterized themselves as unhappy, whereas in 
1984 only 10% did so (Veenhoven 1993:table 1.2.3). Likewise in Brazil ratings on the Cantril 
ladder rose from 4.6 in 1960 to 6.2 in 1975 (Veenhoven 1993:table 1.3.1). Both these 
increases in happiness occurred in a period of marked economic development. 
  During the last decade happiness has increased slightly in most European countries. 
This increase is most pronounced in the originally least happy nations (France, Greece, Italy, 
Spain). This catching up of Mediterranean nations with North-West Europe is visible in 
several indicators of happiness (Veenhoven 1993:tables 1.1.1b, 1.1.2b and 2.2). 
 
 Again we must keep in mind that this data comes, for the greater part, from affluent countries 
in an era of stability. The average happiness of citizens may be more variable in countries that 
provide less buffers and experience more turmoil. 
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3.2 Situational consistency: Are people equally happy in good and bad countries? 
 If happiness is a cultural stereotype rather than an individual evaluation, we can expect that it 
is largely unrelated to the quality of living conditions in the country. Consequently countries 
that provide good living conditions will not stand out by higher average happiness than 
countries of poor living conditions. Likewise changes to the good or the bad in countries will 
have little or no effect on the average happiness of citizens.  
 
 Cross-sections: higher happiness in countries that provide better living conditions 
 To check this prediction I gathered data about the quality of living conditions for the 30 
countries of which we have comparable happiness scores (the countries enumerated in Scheme 
5). I found comparable performance indicators on the material comfort these nations provide 
for their citizens, on the  freedom, their political system allows, on the degree to which they 
save the pains of inequality and the degree to which they provide their citizens access to 
knowledge. Details about measurement can be found in appendix B. These country 
characteristics were correlated with average happiness. The results are presented in exihibit 7. 
All performance indicators appear to be related to average happiness. Economic affluence is 
the strongest predictor. Yet social equality and education relate to happiness independant of 
income per capita. Together they explain no less than 88% of the variance! 
 
 Follow-ups: Slight effects of economic change in rich nations. 
 A test of the prediction that happiness remains the same through prosperity and adversity 
requires time-series on happiness over periods in which marked changes occur such as wars, 
revolutions or economic crises. However the available time-series concern a period of peace 
and rather smooth economic growth. This seriously limits the possibilities to check the 
hypothesis.  
  Elsewehere I have considered the effects of postwar economic growth on 
average happiness in countries (Veenhoven 1989). I observed that a doubling of the material 
standard of living was not parallelled by a doubling of average happiness in the already rich 
USA. Yet economic growth was followed by greater happiness in originally less affluent 
nations such as Brazil and also in West European nations. These latter cases falsify the theory 
that happiness is a national character trait. Together the findings suggest that people get 
happier when material living conditions improve, but that these increments are subject to the 
law of diminishing returns. 
  Together with Sasqia Chin Hon Foei I have also investigated the effects of the 1980-
1982 economic recession in the EC countries. We found that this minor recession was 
followed by  a minor drop in happiness at a 1 year interval. These effects were particularly 
clear in the countries that provide relatively little social security (e.g. Ireland), which means 
that they were least able to buffer the financial effects of economic fluctuation (Chin Hon Foei 
1989). A similar effect has been observed in Japan: the 1975 oil crisis was followed by a clear 
dip in average happiness. (Prime Ministers Office 1987). Again it is clear that average 
happiness in the country is not a static matter. 
 
 
3.3. Inner causation: individual happiness conditioned by collective outlook?  
 The theory that individual happiness is largely a matter of collective outlook can be checked 
in two ways: one way is to inspect whether happy and unhappy nations differ in relevant 
values and beliefs. Another way is to assess whether members of a same culture tend to be 
equally happy in spite of difference in living conditions.  
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 Difference in outlook between happy and unhappy nations 
 Above three hypotheses were mentioned in connection with national  differences in outlook 
that may cause dissimilarity in happiness: 'moral appreciation of happiness', 'cynical attitudes' 
and 'calvinist religion'. Below I will test these hypotheses using data from the 1980 World 
Value Study. 
 
 Moral appreciation of happiness unrelated to level of happiness 
 As suggested above, the differences in happiness between countries may be due to a 
difference in valuation of happiness: happiness acceptant cultures may allow more enjoyment 
of the same things, thereby fostering a more positive view on life. If so, happiness must be 
higher in countries that cherish happiness than in countries that deprecate it. 
  Testing this prediction requires that we measure moral appreciation of 
happiness in countries. I constructed an indicator of that matter on the basis of survey data. 
The European Value Study involved many questions about value preferences. In an earlier 
analysis of these data Halman (1987) distilled several value dimensions and computed 
average scores. Several of these dimensions are indicative of moral appreciation of pleasure 
and satsifaction. One such dimension is the tendency to approve of lust and pleasure as a 
guiding principle in matters of family, marriage, and sexuality. Halman refers to this 
dimension as 'Egoism'. A  second dimension concerns enjoyment and comfort in the realm of 
work ethics. Halman refers to it as the 'Comfort/Materialistic' dimension. I added these two 
factor scores for each country and regarded the sum as a proxi of 'Moral Hedonism' in the 
country. 
  This indicator of moral hedonism is crossed with the level of happiness in the country. 
( See Scheme 8 ).  Average happiness appears not higher in the countries where hedonic 
values are most endorsed (r = +.03). For instance, the three least happy nations are 
respectively low, medium, and high on hedonic value orientation. It is of course possible that 
other measures and other country-sets yield different results. Yet it must be noted that this 
explanation failed its first test. 
  
 No consistent attitudinal cynism in unhappy nations 
 As noted above, Inglehart suggests that the relatively low happiness in the Mediterranian 
countries in Europe is the result of 'cynical attitudes' that may be rooted in earlier generations' 
disappointements. If that is true, unhappy countries must appear to be more cynical. The 
European Value Study involves two indicators that are relevant in this context: mistrust in 
fellow man and mistrust in society.  
  Mistrust in ones fellow men was measured by a single direct question: In 
 general do you think that most people can be trusted? The responses were scored 1) 
can be trusted, 2) don't know and 3) better be careful. I crossed the average mistrust score per 
country with average happiness. In line with the hypothesis mistrust is highest in the least 
happy countries: r = -.59. 
  Mistrust in society was measured by trust in social institutions. Respondents were 
asked to rate their trust in the following ten institutions: the church, the army, the school, the 
law, the press, unions, the police, parliament, civil servants and big business. For each country 
an average trust score was computed. These scores were converted to mistrust and crossed 
with happiness. In this case a positive correlation appears. Mistrust is higher in the most 
happy nations: r = +.35. 
  Inglehart's prediction is thus only partially confirmed: a cynical attitude towards 
fellow man is indeed related to unhappiness in the country, but a cynical attitude towards 
society is not. The absence of a correlation with mistrust in society is the more noteworthy in 
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the context of Ingleharts suggestion that cynical attitudes result from earlier social 
disorganisation. If so, that must manifest itself in sceptism about society in the first place.  
  
 Calvinist countries not less happy  
 The claim that the cultural heritage of Calvinism is predisposed to unhappiness can be easily 
checked.A look at Scheme 5 shows that the countries where Protestantism dominates belong 
typically to the happiest group: Britain, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. On the other 
hand happiness is typically low in Roman Catholic countries such as Belgium, France, Italy 
and Spain. Does that mean that the reverse is true, but that happiness is still conditioned by 
religious outlook? That does not seem to be the case either.The happiest country in Scheme  5 
is The Netherlands, which is religiously mixed.  
 
 Homogenity in happiness within cultures 
 If individual evaluations of life are heavily conditioned by collective outlook (rather than by 
individual reference), we can expect much homogenity in happiness within cultures. That 
homogenity must appear in similarity of happiness across social categories in countries. It 
must also manifest itself in similarity across borders between people reared in the same 
culture. For instance, the happiness of migrants must remain close to the level in their mother 
country and there must be little difference in average happiness between nations that share the 
same cultural heritage. Below I report some tests of these inferences.  
 
 Happiness of students not always alike to happiness of general population 
 If individual happiness is largely a matter of collective values and beliefs, we can expect that 
all citizens in a country are effected by the prevailing outlook. Country differences observed 
in general population samples must then be reproduced in comparisons between specific 
social categories. For instance, if we focus on rich people only, we must find about the same 
difference in happiness between India and the Netherlands as reported in Scheme  5, supposing 
that in both countries the rich look at their life through the same culturally coloured glasses as 
the non-rich. 
  This implication can best be tested by splitting up the data in Scheme  5 by income, 
age and gender. However, this is easier said than done. Not all the data sets are available and 
categorizations are not identical. An easier way to do the same job is to compare average 
population means with mean happiness among university students. Data about happiness in 
university students in most of the countries in Scheme  5 is available from a 43 nation study by 
Michalos. University students are an attractive category for comparison in this context. Their 
social position is fairly similar in all countries.  
  The country differences in happiness among students appear not identical to the 
differences among general population samples. The differences are smaller and the rank order 
is not the same. In India and Mexico students are fairly happy, whereas the general population 
is not. In Thailand students are relatively least happy, whereas the general population average 
is modal. There are also consistent cases however: the Netherlands, USA, UK at the positive 
side and Japan, Korea and Greece at the negative side. These cases produce a correlation of 
+.42 in this nation set. (Data not shown). 
  This finding means that shared views can at best determine average happiness in a 
country to a limited extent. Probably they do even less. The correspondence in happiness 
between students and the general population depends obviously on other things as well, in 
particular on societal characteristics, such as economic development, freedom and equality. 
Remember Scheme  7. 
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settlement 
 If Inglehart is right in that happiness is largely determined by "socialized attitudes" that are 
"transmitted through generations", we can expect that the happiness of migrants will be more 
similar to happiness in their country- of-origin than to average happiness in the country-of-
settlement. Though living conditions may be different in the new country (mostly better), they 
are looked at from the same cultural perspective.  
  This prediction was tested in an analysis of studies in Australia and West Germany. 
Two Australian studies in the 1980's assessed the happiness of migrants from Britain, Greece, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Yugoslavia. Data is summarized in Scheme 10. Migrants 
appear about as happy as native Australians and differences among migrants are small. Yet 
Scheme 10 also shows that there are marked differences in happiness between countries of 
origin. Happiness is clearly lower in Greece and Italy than in Australia. Only Britain, Ireland 
and The Netherlands are at the same level. Clearly migrants from unhappy countries are not 
saddled with a pessimistic outlook that prevents them from enjoying life as much as their new 
compatriots. A similar tendency can be observed in the results of two studies in West-
Germany. Here again the happiness of migrants (from Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia) is closer to the average in the host country than to the average in the mother land.  
  Cultural trait theory also predicts that the hierarchy of happiness in home countries 
must be reproduced among migrants. For that purpose rank order correlations were computed 
both in Australia and in West Germany the results are contradictary: in one study no 
correlation (r = +.10 and +.03), in the other a sizable (but still statistically insignificant) 
correlation: r = +.58 and +.50. 
  
 Happiness is not the same in East and West Germany 
 The theory that happiness is a cultural trait would also predict that East and West Germans are 
about equally happy. Germans share the same cultural heritage and speak the same language. 
The political separation lasted only half a generation and did not cut off all cultural exchange.  
  The data clearly falsify that prediction. East Germans are less happy than West 
Germans: in 1990 scores on a 11-step satisfaction scale were respectively 6.0 and 7.3 in 1991 
(Landua 1992:33).  
  The current difference can be explained by poorer living conditions in former East 
Germany. In the following decade succesful resurrection will probably erase the dissimilarity 
in happiness.  
 
 Obviously one can think of more specifications of the theory that happiness is a matter of 
cultural outlook. In fact it is quite difficult to test such a broad claim exhaustively.  For the 
time being we must conclude that these first tests provide little support. 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 The reason for this inquiry was the question whether improvement of society can make 
citizins any happier. That question can now be answered affirmatively. Happiness is not so 
invariable a matter that it is insensitive for improvement or detoriation of living conditions. 
Though people do not change their judgement of life every day at every whim of fate, they do 
adjust the evaluation periodically and take major life-chances into account. As such happiness 
is a suitable end goal for social policy (though not necessarily the only one) and a useful 
indicator of policy success. 
 
 This leads us to ask the question why is current opinion to the contrary? Four reasons seem to 
be involved, two technical distortions and two ideological fallacies.  
 Happiness of migrants is closer to happiness in homeland than to happiness in country-of-
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  Firstly, the bulk of the available research findings seemed to indicate that people tend 
to remain equally happy. As we have seen most follow-up studies considered relative stability 
over short periods and found surprisingly little change. The few long term studies seem to 
have been snowed under. Absolute stability has not yet been considered. 
  Secondly, high relative stability rates have been found in studies that use measures 
which tap broader aspects of psychological well-being than just happiness. The much used 
Life-Satisfaction Index (Neugarten et al 1962) for instance also involves items about 'planning 
mindedness', 'self-respect' and 'views on social progress'. These attitudes may be more fixed 
than happiness is.  
   Thirdly, the theory that happiness is trait provides an easy explanation for the 
common observation that happiness is hardly linked to social positional variables such as 
income, education, sex and age: at least not in modern western nations. This finding was a 
surprise for most investigators who had hoped to demonstrate psychological consequences of 
social inequality. They were reluctant to conclude that present day western society is 
apparently so equal and affluent that traditional cleavages hardly matter any more. Therefore 
they rather attributed the non-difference to a presumed psychological insensitivity of the 
outcome-measure. 
  Lastly, there is sceptism about happiness that is rooted in long-standing discussions 
about value priorities. The Utilitarian position that happiness marks the ultimate value is not 
accepted by everybody and advocates of alternative value priorities tend to denounce 
happiness as 'fleeting' 'relative' and 'spoiling'. The idea that happiness is 'fixed' fits that 
negative view. Indications in that direction are therefore readily accepted. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 Contrary to current opinion happiness is no trait; neither a personal trait nor a cultural trait. 
Both at the individual level and the collective level happiness does not meet the classic three 
definitions of trait. 
  Firstly, happiness is not temporally stable. Individuals revise their evaluation of life 
periodically. Consequently their happiness rises and drops, both absolutely and relatively. 
Average happiness of nations appears not immutable either. Though stability prevails, there 
are cases of change. 
  Secondly, happiness is not situationally consistent. People are not equally happy in 
good or bad situations. Improvement or detoriation of life is typically followed by according 
changes in the appreciation of it. This is also reflected at the collective level. Average 
happiness is highest in the countries that provide the best living conditions. Major changes in 
condition of the country affect average happiness of its citizens. 
  Lastly, happiness is not enterily an internal matter. It is true that happiness rooted to 
some extent in stable individual characteristics and collective orientations, but the impact of 
these inner factors is limited. They modify the outcome of environmental effects rather than 
dominating them. 
 
 These findings knock the bottom out of the argument that happiness is too static a matter to be 
influenced by social policy. There is thus still sense in pursuing greater happiness for a greater 
number.  
  The findings also refute the related claim that happiness is not a useful social 
indicator. Though happiness may be a slowly reacting instrument, it does reflect long-term 
change for better or worse. 
 
  Rotterdam, March 1993
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SCHEME 1 
   Variants of the theory that happiness is a personal trait  
 
1a    Happiness varies with ups and downs in life, 1b  Happiness remains essentially the same through 
 but interpersonal differences tend to remain.   
 time, both absolutely and relatively. 
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SCHEME 2 
 Overtime-correlations of happiness observed in 26 longitudinal studies 
                             
Predicted pattern:         Observed pattern: 
 happiness  remains stable over the years              Happiness is not very stable in the long run 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
 
                              Data: Appendix A         + = Overall happiness   . = Affect level   * = Contentment 
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SCHEME 3   HAPPINESS OF THE UNFORTUNATE: SOME CROSS-SECTIONAL FINDINGS 
Adversity Indicator of 
happiness  
Observed differences in happi-
ness1) 
Population Source 
Bereaved 
Husband died in 
minefire: 
6 month ago 
Question on hap-
piness 
 
 
Cantril ladder 
widows:unhappy: 56 % 
controls:unhappy: 12% 
 
widows:modal happiness: 4 
controls: modal happiness: 7 
Minerswives,  
USA, 1972  
N = 247  
Bahr & 
Harvey 
1980:24 
Wife died Question on 
happiness 
widower: very happy: 20 % 
married: very happy: 40 % 
60+ aged males,  
USA, 197-
2/73/74  
N: 388 
Glenn, 
1975:596 
Parent died Cantril ladder 
 
 
Affect Balance 
Scale 
one parent died:mean happi-
ness: 7.2 
both together:mean happiness: 
7.4 
 
one parent died: mean 
happiness: 6.7 
both together: mean 
happiness: 6.1 
Adolescents, 
The Netherlands, 
1985 
N = 2734 
Verkuyten &  
Veenhoven, 
1988:131 
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Adversity Indicator of 
happiness  
Observed differences in happi-
ness1) 
Population Source 
Parents divorced Affect Balance 
Scale 
parents divorced:mean 
happiness: 7.1 
parents together: mean 
happiness: 7.7 
Adolescents, 
The Netherlands, 
1985 
N = 2734   
Verkuyten &  
Veenhoven, 
1988:131 
Handicapped 
child  
Affect Balance 
Scale 
handicapped child:mean 
happiness: 6.7 
matched controls:mean 
happiness: 8.4 
Mothers,   
USA  
N = 68 
Friedrich &  
Friedrich, 
1981:51 
Husband 
unemployed 
Affect Balance 
Scale 
unemployed 1} 
}  Gamma = -.32 (p <.05) 
employed   0} 
Married wives, 
No chief wage 
earner 
USA 1960 
N = 1982,  62 of 
which had an un-
employed 
husband  
Bradburn, 
1969: 184 
 
Problems in family 
SCHEME 3   Continued 
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Adversity Indicator of 
happiness  
Observed differences in happi- Population Source 
from telephone 
directory. N = 22 
Spinal cord 
injured,  
20 yrs after 
injury 
Affect Balance 
Scale 
disabled: mean happiness: 5.0 
normals: mean happiness: 5.4 
Injured: 40+ 
aged, USA 
Non institutio-
nalized, 
 
Normals: 18+ 
aged population, 
USA, N = 6928 
 
Schulz & 
Decker 
1985:1167 
Born 
handicapped 
3 item index on 
satisfaction, 
mood and 
frustration 
malformed: mean happiness: 
7.4 
controls: mean happiness: 7.7 
Handicapped: 
students and pa-
tients of a clinic.  
N =144 
Controls: mat-
ched for age 
gender and situa-
tion (largely 
hospitalized as 
well) N =151 
Cameron et 
all, 
1971: 641/2 
Physically disabled 
 
Paralyzed 
accident victims, 
1-12 month after 
injury 
Question on 
happiness 
disabled: mean happiness: 5.4 
controls: mean happiness: 7.0 
Accident victims 
USA  
N = 29   
Controls picked 
Brickman et 
al 
1978:921 
SCHEME 3     Continued 
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Adversity Indicator of 
happiness  
Observed differences in happi-
ness1) 
Population Source 
Black in the USA Cantril ladder Whites:mean happiness: 6.4 
Blacks: mean happiness: 5.5 
18+ aged  
USA 1973 
N = 1433 
Andrews & 
Withey, 
1976:323 
Coloured in 
South Africa 
5 item index of 
questions on 
happiness and 
lifesatisfaction 
Whites: mean happiness: 7.3 
Indians: mean happiness: 6.9 
Coloureds: mean happiness: 
6.9 
Africans: mean happiness: 5.4 
Adults,  
South Africa, 
1982/3 
N = 5587   
Moller, 
1988:73 
Religious 
minority in  
neighbourhood, 
USA 
6 item index of 
questions on 
happiness and 
mood 
majority: unhappy: 16% 
minority: unhappy: 23% 
Adolescents,  
New York, USA, 
1960 
N = 1618     
Rosenberg, 
1962:3 
Immigrant 
worker in West-
Germany 
Question on 
satisfaction with 
life 
 
Question on 
happiness 
German workers:mean 
happiness: 7.7 
Foreign workers: mean 
happiness: 6.9  
 
German workers: unhappy: 
4% 
Foreign workers:unhappy: 
18% 
Workers,  
West-Germany, 
1980/82   
N = 1375   
 
Zapf & 
Brachtel, 
1984:294 
Immigrant child Cantril ladder Dutch children: mean Secondary sc- Verkuyten,  
Minority status in society 
in the Ne-
therlands 
 
 
Affect Balance 
Scale 
happiness: 7.7 
Foreign children:mean 
happiness: 6.8 
 
Dutch children: mean 
happiness: 6.6 
Foreign children:mean 
happiness: 6.0 
hool pupils,  
The Netherlands, 
1986 
N = 261  
1986:4 
 1) mean and modal happiness scores as transformed linearly to range 0-10 
 
SCHEME 3    Continued 
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SCHEME 4    CHANGE IN HAPPINESS FOLLOWING FORTUNE AND ADVERSITY: SOME LONGITUDINAL  FINDINGS 
Fortune/advers
ity 
Time span Indicator of 
happiness 
Observed change in happiness 
 
Population Source 
Unemployment  
Becoming 
unemployed 
 
 
 
9 month: 
T1: 1963/1 
T2: 1963/10 
Affect Balance 
Scale 
Happiness in average ridits on range 0-1: 
T1: employed:            .49 
T2: unemployed:  .36 
 
Chief wage 
earners 
USA, 1963 
N=931 of which 
39 lost their job 
between T1-T2 
Bradburn,  
1969:189 
  4 years: Question on 
happiness T1: 1977 
T2: 1979 
T3: 1981 
Significant drop in happiness among unem-
ployed who became worse off financially. Not 
among other unemployed 
Working adults,  
Nebraska, USA, 
1977/8  
N=444 of which 
69 stopped wor-
king between T1 
Eels 
1985:156 
and T3 
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Staying unem-
ployed: after 
job loss 
6 months: 
 
T1: 1973/3 
T2: 1973/4 
T3: 1973/6 
T4: 1973/9 
Time sampling 
of mood (by 
dairy) 
Mean happiness of still unemployed on range 
0-10  
T1: 1 month:               8.0 
T2: 2 month after:   8.2 
T3: 3 month after:   8.1 
T4: 6 month after:   7.7 
Unemployed, 
shortly after job -
loss 
Austria, 1973 
N=31 of which 9 
were still unem-
ployed at T4 
Kirchler,  
1985:16 
Staying unem-
ployed: 
after leaving 
school 
2 years: 
T1: 1980 
T2: 1981 
T3: 1982 
Depressive 
affect 
(score reversed 
to indicate 
happiness) 
Mean happiness on range 0-10: 
T1: still in highschool:  6.4 
T3: unemployed 3 years later:  5.8 
School leavers,  
Australia, 1980-
82 
N = 910  
Feather & O'Brien, 
1986:132 
Unemployment   continued
SCHEME 4     Continued 
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Divorce  4 years:
T1: 1972 
T2: 1976 
 
 
 
4 years: 
T1: 1977 
Index of 
Depressive 
affect 
 
 
 
 
 
Divorce is followed by an increase in depressi-
ve affect. 
T2 divorce status by T2 depression controling 
T1 depression and prior conditions: ß = +.10 
 
 
 
Divorce is followed by change in happiness: 
Marrrieds,  
Chicago, USA 
N=758 of which 
32 divorced be-
tween T1 and T2 
 Marrieds,  
Nebraska, USA 
Menaghan 
1986:324 
 
 
 
 Eells,  
1985:117 
T3 past years events by T5 happiness: ß = +.09 
 
Beta's controled for T1 happiness as well as for 
personality and social status variables 
N = 488 of which 
34  divorced T1 
and T3 
T2: 1979 
T3: 1981 
Question on 
happiness but not always to the negative: males and well 
educated get less happy, females and  low  
educated get more happy. 
Bereavement 
Death of 
spouse 
4 years: 
T1: 1977 
T2: 1979 
T3: 1980 
Question on 
happiness 
Those widowed became drastically less happy 
after bereavement, but partly recovered after 2 
years 
Adults,  
Nebraska, USA 
N = 1188 of 
which 29  
became widowed 
between T1 and 
T3 
Eells,  
1985:110 
SCHEME 4     Continued 
Ruut Veenhoven 28 Is happiness a trait?
Summed life-events   
Negative 
event-score  
 
11 years: 
T1: 1969 
T2: 1971 
T3: 1974 
T4: 1976 
T5: 1980 
Question on 
happiness 
Adverse events are followed by a drop in hap-
piness; positive effects by a rise. The effects 
diminish through time.  
 
T5 past years events by T5 happiness: ß = -.42 
T4 past years events by T5 happiness: ß = -.16 
T3 past years events by T5 happiness: ß = +.00 
People in transiti-
on California, 
USA 
N= 163 
Chiriboga 1982:23 
Positive event-
score 
  T5 past years events by T5 happiness: ß = +.30 
T4 past years events by T5 happiness: ß = +.12 
  
   
T2 - T3 Change in net event-score explains 
Change in happiness: R2 = .51 
 
Heady & Wearing 
1988:29 
 
 
 
 
Net event-score 
(favourable 
minus adverse) 
4 years: 
T1: 1983 
T2: 1985 
T3: 1987 
Question on 
happiness asked 
twice in each 
interview 
Earlier netscores (T1, T2) predict later happi-
ness (T2, T3) even when the causal effect of 
happiness on life-events is removed. 
- Earlier eventscore -> Later happiness: ßL = 
+.22 
- Earlier happiness -> Later eventscore: ßL = 
+.18 
 
Standard maximum Likelyhood Estimates (ßL) 
obtained in LISREL analyses that also 
controled T1 personality and social status 
Adults 
Victoria, 
Australia 
N = 649 
Heady & Veenhoven 
1989:119 
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SCHEME 5  HAPPINESS IN 30 NATIONS AROUND 1980 
             
 Taking all together, how happy would you say you are? 
   very    pretty         neither/nor   DK     standardized 
    fairly not too NA mean 10 - 0 
    quite unhappy 
     not at all              
India  6 31 62                    1       5.16 
Greece 10 40 48 2  5.60 
Russia (White) 11 52 37 -  5.99 
Portugal 11 70 21 -  6.18 
Korea (South) 11 59 30 -  6.20 
Mexico 26 34 37 3  6.31 
Italy 10 65 23 2  6.47 
Philippines 18 50 33 -  6.47 
Hungary 11 66 22 2  6.60 
Spain 20 58 22 2  6.84 
Japan 15 62 16 8  6.94 
Germany (West) 10 69 13 8  6.98 
Switzerland 26 65  9 -  6.99 
South Africa 27 54 18 2  7.07 
Luxemburg 28 62  8 2  7.08 
 
 
 
Singapore 32 58  9 -  7.15 
Brazil 40 36 22 1  7.22 
France 19 70  9 2  7.24 
Finland 19 72  7 1  7.35 
Norway 28 64  8 -  7.45 
USA 31 60  9 1  7.55 
Belgium 31 57  7 5  7.57 
Sweden 29 66  4 2  7.62 
Netherlands 44 50  6 -  7.63 
Denmark 30 63  4 3  7.67 
N.Ireland 39 55  5 1  7.74 
Britain  38 57  4 1  7.74 
Australia 34 61  4 1  7.75 
Canada 35 61  4 -  7.76 
Ireland 39 54  4 3  7.82 
Iceland 43 53  4 1  7.96 
     
                        Data: Veenhoven 1993, table 1.1.1a+b+c 
  Standardized means computed on the basis of weights awarded to response categories by judges.  
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SCHEME  6 
 
 
RELATIVE TEMPORAL STABILITY OF AVERAGE HAPPINESS IN NATIONS 
             
 
country      rank order of happiness 
       1948  1981 
             
 
Australia        2  2/3 
Britain (Great)        9    7 
France       7/8    5 
Germany (West)       4    1 
Italy       7/8    8 
Netherlands        5    6 
Norway        1  2/3 
Mexico        6    9 
USA         3    4 
             
 
rank order-correlation:     rs = +.73 (p <.01) 
             
Data: Veenhoven 1993, table 1.2.1a and 1.2.2b. Absolute values are not comparable because questions were not identical.  
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SCHEME 7
AVERAGE HAPPINESS AND LIVING CONDITIONS IN 30 NATIONS AROUND 1980 
                                                                           
         
Living conditions in countries    Correlation (r) with average happiness in countries 
 
         listwise (N = 27)  pairwise (N 23 to 27) 
        zero order RGDP  
          controled 
                                                          
Material Comfort 
- Real income per capita       +.71* -     +.70* (N = 27) 
- Social security  +.66* +.24 +.53* (N = 26) 
 
Social Equality 
- Women's emancipation +.77* +.67* +.62* (N = 22) 
 
Freedom 
- Freedom of press +.55* +.28 +.55* (N=27) 
- Political democracy +.57* +.03 +.61* (N=23) 
 
Access to Wisdom 
- Education   +.84* +.65* +.71* (N=27) 
- Media attendence +.54* +.07 +.54* (N=27) 
 
                           
 
Total variance explained: (Adjusted R2)    .88* 
 
Data: Happiness:Scheme  5. Country characteristics: appendix B                                     *p=<.01 
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SCHEMA  8
 
Happiness and moral appreciation of happiness
9 nations around 1980
           
 
 
Data: European Value Survey (Halman et al. 1987)    r = +.00 
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SCHEME 9  
Happiness and attitudinal cynism 
13 nations around 1980                
 
 
9a happiness and distrust in fellow man      9b happiness and distrust in institution 
               
 
Data: European Value Survey: Halman 1991 
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SCHEME 10 
LIFE-SATISFACTION OF MIGRANTS 
 
 
country  average life-satisfaction of migrants                            average life-satisfaction in 
of origin   in country of settlement           country of origin 
Australia        Germany 
19811   19842  19823                        19844                                 1981 - 1983 
N=246   N=656  N=770         N=1569 
 
 
average life-satisfaction                      7.6         7.9                 7.75                         7.4 
in country of settlement (scale 0-10) 
 
 
Greece  7.6            7.4                   7.2                  7.1                  5.96 
Germany               -                    7.7                    -                       -                            7.56 
Ireland    -              8.0                      -                     -                   7.76 
Italy                                                                      7.9                   7.7                  6.9                  7.6                            6.76 
Netherlands                                                             -                    7.8                     -                       -                            8.06 
Spain    -      -      7.1                 8.2                  6.27 
Turkey             -      -      6.2      6.9                    <                  5.08 
UK    8.0      8.0         -             -                  7.66 
Yugoslavia    -   7.7                    7.1      7.8             ±                  5.09 
 
 
rank order-correlation: (rs) 
migrant life-satisfaction by 
satisfaction in country of origin                      +.10(ns)             +.58(ns)        +.03(ns)           +.50(ns) 
 
 
Data: Appendix C 
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APPENDIX A    OVERTIME-CORRELATION OF HAPPINESS IN 26 LONGITUDINAL STUDIES 
Subjects Happiness measure Happi-
ness 
variant10 
Time 
span  
in years 
Overtime- 
correlation  
(in r) 
Bibliografical source 
60+ aged white unmarried females, 
USA 
N=42 
10 item Affect Balance 
Scale 
   A     3   +.38 Adams, 1988:35 
Highschool pupils, USA. 
Followed from age 12 to 15 
N=2213 
6 item index on questions on 
happiness and mood 
   O     1 
    1,5 
    2,5 
    3,5 
  +.61 
  +.54 
  +.45 
  +.43 
Bachman et al, 1970 
(overtime-correlations provided by aut-
hor) 
Highschool pupils, USA. 
Male and Female 
Followed from age 10 to 35 
N=160 
Largely same subjects as studied by 
Tuddenham (below) 
Rating of cheerfulness (vs 
gloomy) on the basis of 
interview protocols 
   A     6 
    6 
 
   15 
   15 
  +.57  M 
  +.50  F 
 
  +.26  M 
  +.36  F 
Block, 1971:302-7 
18+ aged, 2 communities, USA. 
N=547 
Single question on happi-
ness 
   O     0,6   +.48 Bradburn & Caplovitz, 1965:90 
(overtime-correlation computed from fre-
quency table in report) 
People in transition, USA 
High and low stressed 
N=72 
10 item Affect Balance 
Scale 
   A     2 
    5 
    7 
   11 
  +.43 
  +.40 
  +.44 
  +.20 
Chiriboga, 1989:65 
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APPENDIX A     Continued
People in transition, USA 
Males: N=64 
Females: N=76 
Single question on 
happiness 
   O    11 
   11 
  +.03  M 
  +.18  F 
Chiriboga, 1982:23 
Males, Baltimore, USA 
N=557 
Single question on 
satisfaction with 
accomplishments 
   C     5,3 
   12,8 
  +.49 
  +.46 
Costa et al, 1981:81 
Mothers, USA 
Followed 18 months after birth of first 
child 
N=105 
Single question on  
life-satisfaction 
   O     0,6 
    1,5 
  +.61 
  +.51 
Crnic, 1984 
(overtime-correlations provided by aut-
hor) 
Elderly males, rural USA 
N=1319  
Single question on content-
ment 
(how things have worked 
out for you) 
   C    10   +.40 Dobson, 1985:124 
(overtime-correlation computed on the 
basis of frequency table in article) 
18+ aged, Nebraska, USA 
N=1188 
Single question on 
happiness 
   O     2 
    2 
    4 
  +.41 
  +.38 
  +.34 
Eels, 1985:88 
 
18-65 aged, Victoria, Australia 
N=649 
Single question on 
appreciation of life, asked 
twice each interview 
(7 step Delighted-Terrible 
   O     2 
    4 
    6 
  +.53 
  +.42 
  +.40 
Heady, 1989 
(overtime-correlation provided by author) 
about life) 
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APPENDIX A   Continued
Volunteers, Canada 
N=1000 
Single question on 
appreciation of life 
(10 step Best-Worst Possible 
life) 
 
Single question on  
life-satisfaction 
   O     7 
 
 
 
    7 
  +.17 
 
 
 
  +.25 
Harley & Laverly, 1991:117 
65-95 aged, Canada 
Living in old-age homes 
N=55 
10 item Affect Balance 
Scale 
 
2 item index of questions on 
happiness 'at this moment of 
time' and 'over the past 
month' 
   A 
 
   O 
    0,9 
 
    0,9 
  +.27 
 
  +.57 
Kozma & Stones, 1980:911 
18+ aged, Germany 
Participants Socio-Economic Panel 
N=7091 
Single question on  
life-satisfaction  
(10 step satisfaction) 
   O     1 
    2 
    3 
    4 
    5 
     
  +.46 
  +.39 
  +.37 
  +.34 
  +.32 
Landua, 1992 
(overtime-correlations provided by aut-
hor) 
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Single males and couples, Baltimore, 
USA 
N=459 
10 item Affect Balance 
Scale 
 
Single question on 
appreciation of life 
(7 step Delighted-Terrible 
Scale) 
   A 
 
   O 
    2 
 
    2 
  +.51 
 
  +.61 
McCrae & Costa, 1991:229 
University students, USA 
followed from entry 
N= 
Single question on feeling 
happy 
   A     4 
   10 
   14 
  +.33 
  +.26 
  +.14 
Mortimer & Lorence, 1981:16 
(overtime-correlation reconstructed from 
path diagram) 
Mothers, Berkeley, USA 
Followed from age ±30 to 70 
N=53 (Guidance group) 
N=28 (Control group) 
 
Rating of 'cheerfulness' by 
independant interviewers 
 
Rating of 'satisfaction with 
lot' by independant 
interviewers 
   A 
 
 
   C 
  ±40 
  ±40 
 
  ±40 
  +.28  G 
  +.27  C 
 
  +.15  G 
Mussen et al, 1980:337 
15-60 aged, The Netherlands 
N=296 
10 item Affect Balance 
Scale 
     1   +.52 Ormel, 1980:134 
46-70 aged, Carolina, USA 
Member of insurance association 
N=502 
Single question on  
appreciation of life 
(10 step Best-Worst Possible 
life) 
   O     2 
    4 
  +.56 
  +.40 
Palmore & Kivett, 1977:314 
APPENDIX A     Continued
Babies, Berkeley, USA 
Followed from birth to age 3 
Males: N=27 
Females: N=27 
Time-sampling of cheerful 
utterances 
Ratings were made at 
regular visits at home and in 
clinic.  
Ratings were made at 
month: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30 and 36 
   A     0,4 
 
    0,8 
 
    1,7 
  +.64  M 
  +.72  F 
  +.61  M 
  +.51  F 
  +.50  M 
  +.48  F 
Schaefer & Baily, 1963:29 
Babies, Berkeley, USA 
Followed from birth into adolescence 
(above sample, girls only) 
N=19 
Time-sampling of baby 
cheerfulness (above) and 
extensive interviews on the 
basis of which a rating of 
adolescent 'cheerfulness' 
was made 
   A   ±14   -.11   F Schaefer & Baily, 1963:105 
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Basic school pupils, USA 
Followed from grade 6 to 10 
N=310 
4 item Rosenberg/Simmons 
Depression Scale 
   O     1 
    4 
  +.42 
  +.25 
Simmons et al, 1987:107 
Grandparents and grandchildren, USA 
N=1159 
10 item Affect Balance 
Scale 
   A    14   +.32 Stacey & Gatz, 1991:77 
Highschool seniors, USA 
Followed into adulthood 
Males: N=51 
Females: N=41 
 
 
Largely same subjects as in Block 
(above) 
Single question of 
enjoyment and 
disappointments in life 
 
Single question on 
realisation of wants 
 
Rating of cheerfulness (vs 
gloomy) on the basis of 
extensive interview proto-
cols 
   O 
 
 
   C 
 
 
   A 
   15 
   15 
 
   15 
   15 
            
15 
   15 
  +.10  M 
  +.19  F 
 
  +.23  M 
  +.08  F 
 
  +.26  M 
  +.20  F 
Tuddenham, 1962:666 
 
 
 
 
 
(reported in Block, 1971:81) 
30-50 aged, The Netherlands 
Employed and unemployed 
N=337 
10 item Affect Balance 
Scale 
   A     1   +.48 Verkley & Stolk, 1989:91 
65+ aged, patients, USA 
Geriatric and general medical clinic 
N=205 
10 item Affect Balance 
Scale 
   A     1,5   +.32 Yeo et al, 1987:256 
(overtime-correlation computed from b 
and SD in table)  
APPENDIX A     Continued
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APPENDIX  B 
 
Country-characteristics (used in Scheme  7) 
Material comfort: is measured by the real income per head. 'Real" income means that non-
marked goods and services are taken into account as well, and that purchasing power 
differences are controlled for. Data was drawn from Summers and Heston (1988:125). Next to 
income as such, we also considered income security. We expect this security to be higher in 
the so-called welfare states which guarantee their citizens a minimum material level of living. 
By lack of comparable measures for social security as such, in the countries at hand, we took 
proportions of government expenditures (minus defence) in the gross national product as a 
proxi. Data were drawn from IMF-statistics (IMF 1987) and Japanese government statistics 
(Min. of Finance Japan 1986). 
 
Social equality was measured by inequality between the sexes. Emancipation of women was 
measured by Estes' (1984:171;184/5) Index of Women Status, which involves educational 
participation of women and womens' suffrage. Income equality was not used in this analysis 
by lack of comparable data. 
 
Freedom was measured by freedom of press. Data on that matter from the early 1970's was 
found in Kurian (1979:362). We also considered the political democracy in the country. For 
that purpose we took Estes' Index of Political Paticipation (Estes 1984:175-187). This index 
involves independance of the country, presence and functioning of a parliamentary system and 
limitation of influence of the military. 
 
Access to knowledge was measured by scope of education in the country and attendance to 
mass media. As an indicator of educational performance we took Estes' Education Index 
(Estes 1984:169; 183/4). This index involves school enrolment, expenses on education and 
literacy. As an indicator of access to information from mass media we took the summed 
scores of daily newspaper circulation and the number of radio's as found in Kurian (1979:347-
359). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Data about migrant happiness used in Scheme  10 
 
 1. Victoria Immigrant Survey, 1981, Secondary analysis, 1-9 Terrible-Delighted scale 
transformed linearly to 0-10. 
  2. Australian National Science Survey, 1984, Secondary analysis, 1-10 Dissatisfied-
Satisfied scale transformed linearly to      0-10. 
  3. German Survey among foreign workers (Ausländerumfrage), 1982. Data reported in 
Zapf & Brachtl 1984:294, 0-10 Utmost dissatisfied-Utmost satisfied scale. 
 4. German Socio-Economical Panel, first wave, 1984, Secondary analysis, 0-10 Utmost 
dissatisfied-Utmost satisfied scale. 
 5. German Welfare Survey (Wohlfahrtssurvey) 1980. Data reported in Zapf & Brachtl 
1984:294. 
 6. Eurobarometer 19, 1983. Data reported in Inglehart 1985:12, 0-10 very dissatisfied-
very satisfied scale. 
 7. European Value Study 1981, Secondary analysis, 1-10 dissatisfied-satisfied scale 
transformed linearly to 0-10. 
  8. Estimate on the basis of a cross-national study among university students in which 
Turkish students scored very low (4.2 on a 1-7 Terrible Delighted scale) and lower 
than students in Greece, Spain and Yugoslavia (Michalos 1991:83). 
 9. Estimate on the basis of: 
  a. National sample in 1962 which observed a score 5.0 on a 0-10 Worst-Best Possible 
Life scale (Cantril 1965:258). 
  b. Cross-national study among 15-40 aged in 1967 in which Slovenia scored 5.06 on a 1-
9 Worst-Best Possible Life scale (5.1 on 0-10 scale).  
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1.                Victoria Immigrant Survey, 1981, Secondary analysis, 1-9 Terrible-Delighted scale transformed linearly to 0-10. 
                       2.                Australian National Science Survey, 1984, Secondary analysis, 1-10 Dissatisfied-Satisfied scale transformed linearly to 0-10 
                    3 German Survey among foreign workers (Ausländerumfrage),1982. Data reported in Zapf & Brachtl 1984: 294, 0-10  
  Utmost dissatisfied - Utmost satisfied scale 
  4. German Socio-Economical Panel, first wave, 1984, Secondary analysis,  0-10 Utmost dissatisfied - Utmost satisfied scale 
  5. German Welfare Survey (Wohlfahrtssurvey) 1980. Data reported in Zapf & Brachtl 1984:294 
  6. Eurobarometer 19, 1983. Data reported in Inglehart 1985:12, 0-10 very dissatisfied - very satisfied scale 
  7. European Value Study 1981, Secondary analysis, 1-10 dissatisfied - satisfied scale transformed linearly to 0-10 
                    8. Estimate on the basis of a cross-national study among university students in which Turkish students scored very low (4.2 on a 1-7 Terribl
Delighted scale) and lower than students in Greece, Spain and Yougoslavia (Michalos 1991:83) 
  9. Estimate on the basis of: 
   a. National sample in 1962 which observed a score 5.0 on a 0-10 Worst - Best Possible Life scale (Cantril 1965:258) 
  b. Cross-national study among 15-40 aged in 1967 in which Slovenia scored 5.06 on a 1-9 Worst - Best Possible Life scal
     (5.1 on 0-10 scale) 
  10.             O = Overall happiness    A = Affect level    C = Contentment 
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